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PREFACE 
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SCALING AND LEARNING IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 
B.I. Spinrad 
INTRODUCTION 
Scaling is necessarily a function of learning. At any 
given time, there is a size above which we can't build. Some 
of the reasons are external--a limited market, for example--but 
some are clearly internal. We don't know how to build it, as 
with steel pressure vessels above a certain size and pressure 
capability; or, if we think we know how to build, we sometimes 
don't know how to do it economically--as with sodium-to-steam 
heat exchanges of large capacity. Sometimes, the connection of 
risks in one package gets too big to handle--thus the imposition 
of a capacity limit on light-water reactors (LWR) in the United 
States. And there are doubtless other reasons for things being 
"too big to build". All these limitations change with time. 
We can learn how to avoid or overcome them, or in some instances 
to ignore them as they turn out to be mental rather than physical 
limits, 
Often, the most significant advances, in "learning how to 
do it" and in finding an appropriate scale for a standardized 
product, occur when the technology is new, uncertain and plastic. 
But the strategy of market penetration is itself a factor in 
learning how to build what size plant. The reason is that early 
embodiments of a new technology are rarely economic in them- 
sevles. They are to some extent practice installations, various- 
ly labeled as "large pilot plants", "demonstration units", 
"experimental plants", "pioneer plants" or "prototypes1'. There 
is a tension between two objectives of building such units: to 
achieve economic competitiveness as soon as possible; and to 
minimize the expense of building and operating non-economic 
plants. The first objective emphasizes the positive aspects of 
scaling and introduces a tendency toward rapid growth in scale 
of these plants. The second objective emphasizes the positive 
aspects of learning and introduces a tendency to build minimum- 
size units. Intuitively, one feels that there is an optimal 
trajectory of scale increase under the circumstances. Studying 
this trajectory is a topic for planned research; but it is cer- 
tain that the interaction between scaling and learning is a 
necessary input to that research. And, because this interesting 
phase of commercialization is my particular target, the focus of 
attention here is on this early period--the period of rapid 
scaling and quick learning. 
It goes without saying that I am talking about industrial 
systems here. There are products--hand-held calculators, toys, 
bicycles--whose scale is rigidly circumscribed by the product 
application. They form a class of systems for which the learning 
curve can be applied in almost pure form. But even within 
industrial systems, there are types of plants for which scale is 
circumscribed by a limited market. For example, it would do 
little good for a manufacturer of power-plant turbines,to scale 
his facilities to production of 100 units of, say, 3000 MW-of- 
heat capacity, per year. It is technically possible, and it may 
even have demonstrably lower unit cost, but the market just isn't 
there (at least, now). Thus, we are concerned with industrial 
plants embedded within an industry large enough so that many 
plants, even though they might be of very large size, are needed 
to saturate the market. This is fairly common in basic indus- 
tries. In the following discussion, we shall be considering the 
electrical power generating industry, which meets this criterion. 
Specifically, we shall be taking our examples from, and directing 
our discussion toward, the nuclear component of the electrical 
industry. Two types of system--the light-water reactor (LLJR) in 
the United States and the heavy-water reactor (CANDU) in Canada- 
-provide illustrations of past trajectories. A third type of 
system, the liquid-metal-cooled fast breeder reactor (LMFBR) is 
being developed in several countries and is a proper subject for 
projective study. 
We reserve detailed analysis for our application study, to 
be presented later, and here present a very condensed and quali- 
tative (and - subjective) history of the development of these 
nuclear systems. 
Light water reactors are the dominant nuclear systems of 
the world today. They had their genesis from the use of light 
(ordinary) water reactors in the United States for three pur- 
poses: production of nuclear weapons material (at Hanford); 
reactors for research purposes (Oak Ridge National Laboratory); 
and submarine naval propulsion (Argonne National Laboratory and 
Westinghouse-Bettis). The pressurized water reactors used for 
naval propulsion are actually conceptually derived from research 
reactors. Today's LWR's still bear traces of all three ances- 
tors: fuel design from the naval program, neutronic design and 
construction technology from the production program and control 
and safety design from research reactor experience. 
The first embodiments of LWR's for power were the naval 
propulsion reactors, from which the pressurized water reactors 
(PWR) w e r e  descended,  and expe r imen t a l  b o i l i n g  w a t e r  r e a c t o r s  
(BWR) developed a t  t h e  US Na t iona l  L a b o r a t o r i e s .  The f i r s t  
c o n t i n u ou s l y  o p e r a b l e  power r e a c t o r s  were among t h e s e  l a t t e r ,  
BORAX-I1 ( 3  Mwe, maximum), commissioned i n  1955, and EBWR ( 5  MWe 
maximum) commissioned i n  1956. ( I n  what  f o l l o w s ,  d a t e s  a r e  y e a r  
o f  commissioning.)  The f i r s t  power r e a c t o r  de s igned  f o r  long- 
t i m e  commercial o p e r a t i o n  w a s  t h e  S h i p p i n g p o r t  PWR (60 L W ~ ,  1957) .  
The f i r s t  p r i v a t e l y  o r d e r e d  and commissioned power reactors w e r e  
I n d i a n  P o i n t  #1 (PWR, 265 M W e ,  1962 ) ,  Dresden 1  (BWR, 200 MWe, 
1960) and Yankee-Rowe (PWR, 175 We, 1961) .  There  fo l lowed  a  
p e r i o d  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  slow growth i n  commercial o r d e r s ,  which 
came t o  a n  end w i t h  t h e  o r d e r i n g  and commissioning of  C onnec t i c u t  
Yankee (PWR, 575 We, 1968) and Oys t e r  Creek #1 (BWR,,620 M W e ,  
1969) .  These w e r e  b u i l t  a t  a  s c a l e  which w a s  c o n s i d e r e d  f u l l y  
commercial a t  t h a t  t i m e .  Subsequen t ly ,  a combinat ion o f  s c a l i n g  
a p p l i c a t i o n ,  vendor  i n i t i a t i v e  and s imp le  growth m e n t a l i t y  pro-  
duced a  f l o o d  o f  n u c l e a r  o r d e r s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  p l a n t  c a p a c i t y ,  
which l a s t e d  from 1967-1972. T h i s  came t o  a  s t o p  when a  combina- 
t i o n  of  d imin i shed  growth p o t e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  electr ical  i n d u s t r y  
i n  t h e  US, t h e  appearance  o f  o rgan i zed  p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
n u c l e a r  power, and a d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and indus-  
t r i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  s u p p o r t i n g  LWR' s appeared  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1970 ' s .  The n u c l e a r  i n d u s t r y  o f  t h e  US h a s  been moribund s i n c e  
t h a t  t i m e .  I ts  co n t i n u ed  e x i s t e n c e  is  l a r g e l y  due t o  t h e  
s p i n n i n g  o f f  of  LWR s a l e s  i n t o  f o r e i g n  marke t s ,  ach ieved  v a r i o u s -  
l y  by sale of  r e a c t o r s ,  of  l i c e n s e s  t o  manufacture  a cco rd ing  t o  
US e x p e r i e n c e ,  or  s imply  th rough  emula t ion  by and p a r t n e r s h i p  
w i t h  f i r m s  abroad .  The con t i nued  growth o f  t h e  n u c l e a r - e l e c t r i c  
s u p p l y  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  is  a lmos t  e n t i r e l y  due t o  
d e l a y e d ,  s t r e t c h e d - o u t  d e l i v e r y  o f  o r d e r s  p l aced  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1970 ' s .  
The CANDU reactor h a s  had a  much more g o a l - o r i e n t e d  h i s t o r y .  
I ts  g e n e s i s  was t h e  f i r s t  Canadian r e s e a r c h  r e a c t o r ,  NRX. I n  
s p i t e  of  t h e  o ccu r r en ce  o f  a  major  melt-down o f  t h a t  r e a c t o r  i n  
1950, t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  developed w i t h  it was encourag ing  t o  t h e  
f u r t h e r  ma r r i ag e  o f  heavy-water and PWR technology.  An e x p e r i -  
menta l  r e a c t o r ,  NRU, and a  p i l o t - p l a n t  sys tem,  NPD, fo l lowed .  
Favorab le  o p e r a t i n g  e x p e r i e n c e  and economic p r o s p e c t s  r e s u l t e d  
i n  t h e  commissioning o f  s u c c e s s i v e  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  power p l a n t s .  
The f i r s t ,  Douglas P o i n t ,  had a  power o f  206 MWe and was commis- 
s i o n e d  i n  1968. A f t e r  t h a t  time o r d e r s  f o r  s e v e r a l - u n i t  s t a t i o n s  
go ing  from P i c k e r i n g  # I s  1-4 (515 MWe, 1971-1973) th rough  Bruce 
# I s  1-4 (740 M W e ,  1977-1979), P i c k e r i n g  # I s  5-8 (515 MWe, 1983- 
1 9 8 6 ) ,  Bruce # I s  5-8 (756 MWe, 1983-1986) and D a r l i n g t o n  # I s  1-4 
(881 We, 1986-1 9 8 8 ) .  CANDU r e a c t o r s  have  a l s o  been s o l d  abroad ,  
n o t a b l y  t o  I n d i a  (RAPP, 202 MWe, 1973) which h a s  s i n c e  been 
making i t s  own and t o  P a k i s t a n  (KANUPP, 125 Mwe, 1972 ) .  Competi- 
t i v e  o r  v a r i a n t  v e r s i o n s  of  heavy w a t e r  power r e a c t o r s  have a l s o  
been deve loped ,  b u t  n o t  t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  marke t  p e n e t r a t i o n .  
These i n c l u d e  B r i t i s h ,  German, and Swedish sys tems a s  w e l l  a s  
two a l t e r n a t e  Canadian d e s i g n s .  
The LMFBR h as  been under  l ong  development.  E a r l y  e x p e r i -  
menta l  r e a c t o r s  i n  t h e  US and USSR w e r e  fo l lowed  up by f u r t h e r ,  
l a r g e r  e xp e r i m en t a l  r e a c t o r s  i n  t h e  UK and France.  A p i l o t -  
plant demonstration, EBR-I1 (17.5 Mwe, 1963) and a prototype, 
Enrico Fermi #1 (57 W e ,  1965) were built in the early 1960's 
in the US, but these were not followed up by further commer- 
cialization. At present, France and the USSR, with successful 
operation of large prototypes (PHENIX, 233 W e ,  1973; BN-350, 
350 W e  equivalent, 1973) are the countries most advanced toward 
the commercialization phase. 
A listing of most power reactors of the world, from which 
more summary data can be derived, is found in reference E l l .  
THE SCALING LAW 
In the construction of large industrial facilities, engineers 
are taught to expect economies of scale: that the bigger the 
plant, be it to make electric power, refined oil products, steel, 
chemicals or clothing, the more economical the product will be. 
As a heuristic generalization for this, it is pointed out that 
the plant capital cost is commonly determined by the mass of 
material, and this is roughly proportional to the surface of the 
buildings and equipment; whereas capacity is determined to first 
approximation by plant and equipment volume. Since surface is 
proportional to volume taken to the two-thirds power, we then can 
justify an approximate relation: 
Capital Cost = constant x (plant output rate ) 2/3 
Under these circumstances, the cost per unit product might be 
expected to decrease with the plant capacity according to: 
Cost 
= constant (plant output rate) -1/3 Unit product 
Other heuristics can be invoked to indicate trends of costs 
with scale: 
-- An engineer can sketch out a large project, as a 
physical entity, as easily as he can a small one. 
-- When a component gets large enough, we no longer can 
be sure we can build it. 
-- When a project gets complex enough, management problems 
increase dramatically, and labor productivity may de- 
crease. 
-- Big plants take longer to build than smaller ones, 
thereby incurring larger interest payments during con- 
struction. 
-- Systems with many components are less reliable than 
those with fewer components. 
-- Big pieces take more time to repair than little ones do. 
-- And many more. 
These heuristics are only indicative, and they are not all 
in the same direction. Some considerations (e. g. , engineering 
cost) would appear to indicate a constant cost regardless of 
size--a decrease of unit cost as the reciprocal of plant size; 
complexity,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, i s  a f a s t e r - t h a n - l i n e a r  func t ion  
beyond some p l a n t  s i z e ,  and would tend t o  make t h e  curve  go up. 
Never the less ,  t h e  s t anda rd  s c a l i n g  law i s  w r i t t e n  a s :  
where C i s  c o s t  p e r  u n i t  p l a n t  c a p a c i t y ,  P i s  p l a n t  c a p a c i t y ,  
A i s  a c o n s t a n t  of no rma l i za t ion  and B i s  a " s c a l i n g  parameter" .  
The surface-to-volume h e u r i s t i c  i s  u s u a l l y  expected t o  be t h e  
dominant one, corresponding t o  a va lue  f o r  B of 1/3. A s u r p r i s -  
i ng  number of c a s e s  do,  i n  f a c t  e x h i b i t  e v a l u e s  c l o s e  t o  1/3 
over  p l a n t  s i z e s  of i n t e r e s t .  
Equation ( 1 )  has  obvious  l i m i t a t i o n s .  A s  P + 0, C + w ,  f o r  
example. This  i s  n o t  q u i t e  i n t u i t i v e .  I f  C approaches  a l i m i t  
f o r  s m a l l  P I  a t r i v i a l  change can f i x  equa t ion  ( I ) ,  however. 
I n c l u s i o n  of a s m a l l  c o n s t a n t  A t o  ~ , a k e  t h e  law i n t o  
l e t s  t h e  r e s u l t  converge a s  P -+ 0 without  changing t h e  law f o r  
l a r g e  P. S ince  we w i l l  be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p l a n t s  of  i n c r e a s i n g  
s i z e ,  w e  w i l l  n o t ,  however, r e f e r  t o  t h i s  law f u r t h e r .  
A t  t h e  o t h e r  end of t h e  s c a l e  we g e t  a d i f f e r e n t  problem. 
Some of  t h e  h e u r i s t i c s  t h a t  i n c r e a s e  u n i t  c o s t  w i th  s i z e  can 
become dominant. W e  have a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  l a r g e  s i z e  can 
i n c r e a s e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  p r o j e c t  management and p o s s i b l y  dec rease  
p l a n t  r e l i a b i l i t y .  These i n t r o d u c e  c o r r e l a t e d  expenses  due t o  
i nc reased  c o n s t r u c t i o n  t i m e  ( e .g . ,  i nc reased  f i n a n c i n g  c o s t s ) ,  
l o s s  of  p r o d u c t i v i t y  of  c o n s t r u c t i o n  l a b o r ,  and low c a p a c i t y  
f a c t o r  f o r  t h e  completed p l a n t .  A s  components g e t  l a r g e r ,  more 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  and f i e l d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
i s  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  more expens ive  than  i s  f a c t o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and 
assembly. (The break-poin t  may be  thought  of as t h e  p o i n t  a t  
which a p r o j e c t  can  more p r o p e r l y  be d e s c r i b e d  as " f ie ld -con-  
strutted" t han  as " e r e c t e d " ) .  The problem o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
l i m i t s  t o  t h e  s c a l e  t h a t  can  be reached has  a l s o  been mentioned. 
A l l  of t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  p o i n t  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  a t  any 
g iven  t i m e ,  t h e r e  must be  a p l a n t  s i z e  a t  which u n i t  c o s t  becomes 
a minimum. The s c a l i n g  law i n  i t s  p r i m i t i v e  form, equa t ion  ( I ) ,  
i s  no longer  usab le .  
How t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  is  a primary t a r g e t  of t h i s  
paper ,  and w e  w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  l a t e r .  
THE LEARNING CURVE 
H e u r i s t i c a l l y ,  t h e  l e a r n i n g  curve i s  s impler  t han  t h e  
s c a l i n g  law. It  i s  a formal ized  way of exp res s ing  t h e  q u a l i t a -  
t i v e  thought  t h a t  t h e  more expe r i ence  w e  have,  t h e  more e f f i c i e n t  
we become. 
As with so many other human phenomena, but particularly by 
analogy with psychological time--which expresses the thought 
that any individual perceives time duration essentially as a 
fraction of life experience--we tend to measure production ex- 
perience logarithmically. We learn the same amount with each 
doubling of product output; or so goes the reasoning. Thus, the 
scaling law may be exhibited in one of two forms. The first 
characterizes learning as an absolute cost reduction proportional 
to the lcgarithm of output, i.e. 
where C is a function of the number of units produced so far, 
denoted by n. 
The second uses a relative cost reduction as the measure 
of efficiency, giving 
It does not, as does (31, become negative as n + rn, for which 
E reason we will adopt (4) as the standard learning curve law. 
Note that (4) is well approximated by (3) for small b, if a is 
defined as b C(1). 
There are no difficulties in applying (4) at the early 
stages of production, but as time goes on two problems arise: 
one is formal, the other phenomenological. 
The formal problem with equation (4) is that it appears to 
take the maxim "practice makes perfect" too seriously. Although 
C is always positive, it goes to zero for large n. If only 
because costs of materials are irreducible, there must be a 
limit to how far down cost can be driven. Also, production 
rates must approach a finite limit, implying capital costs that 
are not zero, and we also sense that there are limits to labor 
productivity. Lunch may be cheap, but it is never free. C must 
approach a non-zero asymptote. 
The phenomenological problem is that production takes place 
in a socio-economic environment. Inherent in a dynamic society 
is the notion of change in that environment. Specifically, the 
relative costs of inputs to the production process change. A 
material may become scarcer, labor may command rates which 
escalate at a different pace from productivity, and so on. 
Our recent experience has illustrated the shifting cost of the 
important input, energy. The response of an alert production 
system to these shifting input costs is a reoptimization of in- 
put requirements. This reoptimization is, of course, part of 
the learning process. However, the impact on unit cost is still 
felt, even after reoptimization is achieved. The impact is 
basically a renormalization of the cost curve, even when it is 
expressed in constant-value currency. There is an extrinsic 
time factor involved, in addition to the intrinsic accounting of 
time by the measure of n. 
The learning curve is the natural rule of thumb to use when 
considering costs of mass-produced items. Nevertheless, there 
is no reason why it should not apply to arrays of industrial 
equipment, e.g. factories, as well. However, as contrasted to 
the scaling law, it is usually considered to be essentially 
institutional. That is, the learning curve would be expected 
to be experienced according to the production of a particular 
manufacturer, rather than by total production of all of a group 
of competitors. To be sure, there is cross-talk within an 
industry, usually more than industrial-secret minded managers 
even dream. Thus, we might expect t.hat a perfect learning 
curve would show primary dependence on, not one, but two 
measures of production: nk, the production experience of the 
~ - 
k'th producer, and N Z 1 nk, the total production experience of 
the industry. A further limitation of equation (4) is, then, 
that j.t is both (or either) vague and/or parochial with regard 
to the definition of production experience. 
MODIFIED LAWS 
Both the scaling law and the learning curve are approxi- 
mations, valid for only a limited time, capacity range, pro- 
duction period, and so on. We now go about "fixing up" these 
laws to make them, at least in principle, more adaptable. This 
will, of necessity, increase the number of parameters with which 
we must deal. The resulting curves may be more easily fitted to 
data from the real world; but in fact, this remains an experience 
in pure modeling, and we must be on guard against facile causal 
explanations of what amounts to a simple study in correlation. 
We have noted that the scaling law must give out beyond 
some plant size, and illustrated several heuristics to explain 
this. We now give these mathematical form. What we are 
attempting to do, of course, is to describe properties of the 
cost-capacity curve which arise when we approach or exceed an 
optimal capacity. For this, at least, two extra parameters are 
needed: one to determine the cost-minimum capacity, and another 
to determine what the cost is at that minimum. There are, of 
course, an infinite number of ways to select parametric curves 
of this type. 
The form chosen is 
The choice of (5) makes it easier to identify the parameters 
phenomenologically. PMin is the capacity or size at which C is 
minimum. 6 is the fractional increase in unit cost which is 
exhibited, at PMin, over the unit cost which would be expected 
if the simple scaling law, equation (I), were correct. Many 
other forms could be invented, but any which have the same values 
Of ',in and 6 as equation (5) will show very similar behavior. 
The other modifications which we make in the scaling law is 
to identify the four parameters, A, B, PMin and 6, as functions 
of time. That is, we may write (5) in the explicit form 
We now ask which of these parameters vary either signifi- 
cantly with.time or strongly with time. 
A(t) can vary strongly with time. It is the normalizing 
factor on unit cost, and can be expected to be subject to some 
sort of learning factor. On the other hand, for most applica- 
tions of the scaling law, A is not a significant parameter. 
This is because the question addressed by examining the scaling 
law is "What size plant should be built at a given time?" The 
decisions for which A is important are decisions as to whether 
to build a plant of one type or another; but such decisions rest 
only to a limited extent on economies of scale. 
B can be expected to vary slowly with time. It has already 
been noted that B is determined by the types of economies which 
result from increasing the size of small plants. These are 
dominated by the surface-volume paradigm ( B  around 1 / 3 )  and the 
cost-regardless-of-size paradigm ( B  around 1). There are also 
other factors, which scale differently, even for small plants. 
The main point about B is that it is a fitting parameter to 
express a linear sum of terms, and that the terms which are not 
dominant are large in number. Under these conditions, the 
average change in trend as circumstances change is small. 
The parameter which is both strongly and significantly 
variable with time is PMin. A11 of the factors which increase 
the unit cost of large size plants are subject to learning. We 
can learn how to increase the size and complexity of factory- 
built components; how to improve schedules by contract and work- 
force management; how to design for more efficient servicing 
and shorter and less frequent down-time; and so on. Of course, 
c o n c e p t u a l l y  it seems a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  l e a r n i n g  i n  
a l l  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  some law o f  d i m i n i s h i n g  
r e t u r n s .  But it seems l o g i c a l  t h a t  PMin s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  
t i m e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  s lows .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
'Min i s  a  pa ramete r  t h a t  migh t  be  i t s e l f  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a  
l e a r n i n g  c u r v e .  
F i n a l l y ,  w e  have l i t t l e  t o  g u i d e  u s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
b e h a v i o r  of 6 .  T h i s  pa ramete r  t e l l s  u s  how s h a r p  t h e  c o s t  
minimum i s ,  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ;  f o r  
Thus, when 6 i s  s m a l l ,  t h e  c o s t  minimum i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s h a r p  and 
when 6 i s  l a r g e  it i s  r a t h e r  broad.  F i g u r e  4 i l l u s t r a t e s  c u r v e  
s h a p e s  f o r  sys tems  o f  d i f f e r e n t  6 and two v a l u e s  o f  B .  It  
m i g h t  b e  n o t e d  among o t h e r  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  c u r v e s  i n  F i g u r e  
4 t h a t ,  below PMin, t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o s t  c u r v e  from t h e  
form o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 1 )  ( t h e  s i m p l e  s c a l i n g  law) i s  g r e a t e r  f o r  
l a r g e  6 ,  and a n  e v a l u a t i o n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  f i t  t h e  d a t a  t o  
e q u a t i o n  ( 1 )  might  i n f e r  a  good f i t  f o r  a smaller B v a l u e  t h a n  
r e a l l y  p e r t a i n s .  
A s  t o  t i m e  b e h a v i o r  o f  6 ,  I f i n d  l i t t l e  g u i d a n c e  i n  
h e u r i s t i c s .  It  seems r e a s o n a b l e  t h a t  whatever  l e a r n i n g  t h e r e  
i s  t h a t  p e r m i t s  PMin t o  i n c r e a s e  w i l l  a l s o  act  t o  d e c r e a s e  
c o s t s  a s  P  g o e s  beyond PMin. F o r  t h a t  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n ,  b u t  
p r i m a r i l y  because  of  i t s  g r e a t e r  ma themat ica l  t r a c t a b i l i t y ,  I 
have chosen 6 t o  b e  a  s l o w l y  v a r y i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t i m e .  Then, 
one  c a n  w r i t e  t o  f i r s t  approximati .on 
I t  i s  assumed i n  ( 8 )  t h a t  B and 6 ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  a r e  i n  t h e  l o n g  
r u n  a l s o  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t i m e ,  c a n  b e  h e l d  t o  be  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  a  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  p e r i o d .  
The l e a r n i n g  c u r v e  i s  f a r  e a s i e r  t o  modify.  I t  o n l y  r e -  
mains t o  p o s t u l a t e  a n  a s y m p t o t i c  v a l u e  f o r  u n i t  c o s t - - t h e  
i n t r i n s i c  v a l u e  o f  m a t e r i a l s ,  f o r  example. One c a n  t h e n  w r i t e  
where  Cw i s  t h a t  a s y m p t o t i c  v a l u e .  
HYPOTHESIS 
W e  have  n o t e d  t h a t  s c a l i n g  i s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  l e a r n i n g - - a n  
o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  i s  i n  no s e n s e  o r i g i n a l .  W e  are now i n  a  
p o s i t i o n  t o  f o r m a l i z e  t h i s  a s  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  c o n n e c t i o n  be tween 
t h e  two r u l e s * .  
The e s s e n t i a l  h y p a t h e s e s  are: 
1 .  The movement o f  t h e  p a r a m e t e r  PMin i n  e q u a t i o n  (8) i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  g o v e r n e d  by a  l e a r n i n g  c u r v e .  
2. The economies  o f  t h e  nth p l a n t ,  s e e n  i n  t h e  l e a r n i n g  
c u r v e  ( e q u a t i o n  ( 9 ) )  a r e  economies  o f  s c a l e  a s  w e  p r o c e e d  a l o n g  
t h e  e n v e l o p e  o f  PMin. 
H y p o t h e s i s  ( 1 )  c a n  b e  f o r m a l i z e d  i n  t h e  form t h a t  
PMin(t) = PMin ( n [ t l )  P , ( n ) ,  a s  
W e  now assume t h a t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  p l a n t  o f  s e q u e n c e  number n  i s  
b u i l t  a t  P m ( n )  . The c o s t  a t  P,(n) i s  
From t h e  l e a r n i n g  c u r v e  i t s e l f ,  however ,  w e  have  
Having j u s t  i n s e r t e d  t h e  Cm i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  now 
i g n o r e  it, a t  l e a s t  f o r  i n d u s t r i e s  u n d e r  a c t i v e  p r o d u c t  d e v e l o p -  
ment .  
H y p o t h e s i s  ( 2 )  f o r  Cm = 0 c a n  t h e n  b e  s t a t e d  as 
* T h i s  e q u i v a l e n c e  h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  been  n o t e d  by S a h a l  [ 2 ]  i n  a 
v e r y  g e n e r a l i z e d  form and  t h e  r e s u l t s  c i t e d  h e r e  a r e  a spe -  
c i a l i z a t i o n  o f  h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s e l f - s i m i l a r i t y .  
Then, we can identify terms in (12b) so that 
Equation (13a) is essentially a tautology. (13b) provides, 
however, a means of estimating y; for, if we attempt to 
summarize scaling by examining experience with ever-larger 
plants, we estimate B, and if we attempt to summarize learning 
from the same data we estimate b. Finally, we can estimate y 
directly by examining plant sizes. 
Classical Values 
The usually estim~ted values for both B and b are both 
1/3. That is, a variety of studies of different fields have 
shown that there is a surprising tendency for the deta to fit 
to these "classical" values. In the absence of study, they 
become the standard guess. This implies that the value of y 
is near unity, or that the capacity of the new plant will tend 
to increase linearly in n. 
This general rule should not be considered as contradic- 
tory to the other rule that new (and supposedly most economical) 
plant tends to be of a capacity which is a constant fraction of 
the total industrial capacity. Early in the industry, new 
plant is dominant, and the ratio of plant size to industry size 
is large. Initially, it decreases as l/n, approximately. But 
after a while, old, smaller plants are decommissioned, and only 
the last "k" plants are really important. The ratio of new 
plant size to industry size then approaches the ratio l/k. 
Nuclear Industry Values 
The nuclear industry does not appear to be a classical 
industry. The value of B is unusually large, corresponding to 
the fact that a large fraction of small-plant costs go into 
engineering services, licensing activities and land-prepara- 
tion. These are activities whose costs are, to first approxi- 
mation, invariant with plant size, and push B from its classi- 
cal value of 1/3 in the direction of unity. The value of B 
actually seems to be of the order of 0.5, and it is this high 
value which led the early nuclear industry in the direction of 
very rapid scaling. 
There are less data to indicate what the value of b is, 
but it is probably lower than 1/3. The nuclear industry tended 
to standardize power reactor construction practices earlier in 
time than most new industries. Moreover, these practices were 
not rapidly evolving ones: they were in almost every case 
adaptations of practices from the fossil-fueled power plant 
industry, with regressions in some performance criteria (for 
example, steam temperature). The fossil power plant industry 
is an old one, at the end of a long learning curve. Finally, 
the severe pressure of anti-nuclear agitation has enforced a 
dearee of conservatism* on nuclear design practice which has 
very much interfered with innovation. There are some signs 
that, as a result, b is negative for some periods of time, even 
when adjusted for construction-industry inflation. Over the 
long run, it is however undoubtedly small and positive. 
Thus, y is probably closer to 0.5 than to unity, and may 
be even smaller. The consequence is that plant size should be 
growing only slowly. 
If we take 60  MWe as the size of the first LWR (Shipping- 
port) and the round number of 1 0 0  plants commissioned so far, 
y = 0.5 would lead to 600  MWe as the standard size now. The 
actual rating of the standard LWR is now 1200  MWe but there 
are indications that this is larger than optimum, and indeed 
by perhaps a factor of 2 [ 3 ] .  We could not anticipate 1200  AMW~ 
being the optimum until of the order of 400 plants have been 
built. This will happen by 1 9 9 0  according to present con- 
struction schedules, and it is notable that these plants on 
order are virtually all 1 2 0 0  MWe or less. Conversely, if 1200 
MWe were the optimum, now, y would have the value 0.65, and the 
optimum plant in 1990 would be almost 3000  MWe. 
FINDING THE PARAMETERS 
If one has a parametric law of engineering systems, and 
the parameters are not derivable from first principles, they 
are normally found by least squaring the data that exist. In 
so doing, other functional dependences that are extrinsic--in 
the case of economic scaling and learning, such time- or 
lccation-dependent variables as differences in economic 
setting (i.e., variable physical conditions, local regulations, 
etc.1--are also included in a regression analysis, so that if 
their effects are significant they can be corrected for. The 
corrected data are the data of "pure" scaling and learning. 
That is, they-represent the best set of "ceteris paribus" data 
one can develop from experience. 
Such data are rarely smooth. When plotted on log-log 
paper--again, a common engineering practice--they might resemble 
*This conservatism results from the effects of public pressure 
on the licensing process. Both regulatory agencies and the 
industry are reluctant to "rouse the animals" by considering 
significant changes. 
Figure 1, for a scaling system. Data of this quality are often 
experienced, and are usually treated, not by sophisticated data 
analysis, but by the "data band and central tendency" lines 
also drawn on Figure 1. The justification is that any departure 
from non-linearity which is not visible is likely to be re- 
flected as an insignificant higher-order term in a regression 
analysis. 
An a priori estimate of scaling behavior can also be made, 
and indeed is more in the spirit of "other things being equal". 
An experienced designer (or design team) is instructed to 
design plants differing from each other only in plant capacity. 
Then this, or a different, team is asked to prepare a con- 
sistent set of ground rules for costing, and to estimate the 
cost of each plant. The resulting set of cost estimates is 
likely to look like Figure 2. The points show less scatter 
than a posteriori plots, for obvious reasons; however, it is 
common to see discontinuities within the general trends, as 
size-limited subsystems or technologies may be optimum only 
within some range of sizes. 
Both Figures 1 and 2 exhibit bands within which all points 
are located, and a central line showing the main trend. Both 
figures have also been intentionally drawn to be deceptive; 
one might call them malicious illustrations of the tendency 
to look at figures as straight lines. In fact, both curves 
were drawn from credible plots which scattered originally around 
a curve with a minimum. In Figure 1, the minimum was near the 
abscissa of the third point from the right; in Figure 2, the 
minimum was just beyond the farthest point to the right. We 
now take up the matter of discovery of such "hidden minima". 
Figure 3 presents some of the curves which can be drawn 
according to equation (8) for B = 0.3. It can be noted that 
when 6 is small--less than 0.3--the curves to the left of 
'"Min = 0.1 are virtually identical; and that when 6 is very 
small--0.1 or less--the minimum is quite sharp. When 6 is 
large, the minimum is very shallow, and even the logarithmic 
slope of the curve at P/PMin = 0.1 deviates somewhat from the 
asymptotic value for small P. 
Figure 4 presents curves for a more restricted range of P: 
from P/PMin = 0.1 to P/PMin = 3. This is about as large a range 
over which good data for industrial plant costs could be as- 
sembled at any given time. Typically, data for very small 
plants,decades smaller than commercial plants, pertain to pilot 
or experimental systems or to very old ones; it is very rash to 
try to correct such data to simulate small plants that would be 
typical of current industrial practice. Indeed, in many system 
types, and specifically for the case of nuclear power plants, 
the range over which usable data can be procured is even less 
than Figure 4's factor of 30. 
Visual inspection of Figure 4 reveals that: 
-- For B = 0.3 the minima are extremely flat for a factor 
of 2 in P near PMin (i . e. , from P/PMin = 0.7 to 1.4). 
-- If one were examining data below P/PMin . = 1.5, it would 
be tempting to fit them to a straight line on the plot 
(i.e., a simple power law) whose slope is less than 0.3 
in absolute value. 
-- For B = 0.5 the minima are much sharper. Only for 
large 6 would the curves suggest the possibility of a 
simple power law with small B .  
Figure 4 has a point on it that illustrates an error bar 
of 215%. This is a fairly consistent mean scatter of costs 
about estimates, and is thus the measure of how far real data 
points might scatter around the theoretical curves drawn. 
Figure 1 is, in fact, derived from one of the curves of Figure 
4 with the 15% scatter spreading the points, and Figure 2 from 
one of the curves in Figure 3. The cryptic parentheses in 
Figures 1 and 2 can now be deciphered. 
Recall now that the point of all these observations is to 
find a robust way of assigning the parameters of equation 8. 
Recall also that we have assumed B to be a known parameter, 
historically continuous, so that if our data deviate from ex- 
pected ranges of B (particularly, on the low side in absolute 
value) we can suspect an approach t.o a minimum. Finally, re- 
call that at any given time A(t) is an arbitrary normalizer. 
In other words, all these observations are aimed at deriving 
 in and 6. 
Now note thzt if 6 is small, 
'Min is rather sharp, and 
should be quite easily observable. Unfortunately, this does 
not often actually happen. For example, referring to Figure 3, 
if the scatter of points is +15X, we might have difficulty 
locating P Min within a factor of at least 2, even for 6 as 
small as 0.1. A fairly robust rule for locating PMin when the 
existence of a minimum is clearlv visible is to estimate it as 
where P1 and P2 are, respectively, the lower and upper end of 
the range over which PMin appears to lie. Given PMin, 6 can 
usually be estimated fairly precisely, and if older estimates of 
5 exist it can be compared to these estimates. 
A more troublesome case is to try to locate PMin when one 
can not see it--or at least not see it clearly. There are two 
sets of circumstances under which this problem might arise: 
1 .  When 6 i s  l a r g e ,  and one sees a n  e s s e n t i a l l y  f l a t  
r a n g e  of  P  o v e r  which v a r i a t i o n s  of C a r e  l o s t  i n  t h e  d a t a  
n o i s e .  
2 .  When t h e  d a t a  do n o t  e x t e n d  up t o  PMin. 
The second o f  t h e s e  c a s e s  i s  f a i r l y  r a r e ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  w e  
s h a l l  d i s c u s s  l a t e r .  The f i r s t  c a s e  d o e s  p e r m i t  f a i r l y  r o b u s t  
d a t a  e s t i m a t i o n ,  however. 
When t h e  c u r v e  shows a  f l a t  bot tom,  w e  have a  good 
e s t i m a t i o n  o f  
F o r  example,  i f  w e  t a k e  d a t a  w i t h i n  a  s c a t t e r  r a n g e  (which 
s h o u l d  b e  v i s i b l e )  w e  c a n  i s o l a t e  t h o s e  d a t a  w i t h i n  2 o f  t h e s e  
s igmas  of  some minimum p o i n t .  
 in c a n  b e  r o u g h l y  e s t i m a t e d  a s  
t h e  v a l u e  below which 1 / 3  o f  t h e s e  d a t a  p o i n t s  l i e ,  and i t s  
v a l u e  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  b e  a s  much a s  o n e  sigma i n  error .  T h i s  
g i v e s  u s  one  e s t i m a t e  o f  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  PMin, 6 (assuming t h a t  
A ,  B a r e  known from e x t r i n s i c  d a t a ) .  W e  t h e n  need a n o t h e r  
f u n c t i c n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  b e  a b l e  t o  e s t i m a t e  PMin, 6 .  
Of c o u r s e ,  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  e s t i m a t e  PMin, 6 i s  o f  somewhat 
academic i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  What w e  know i s  t h a t  C i s  c l o s e  
 in f o r  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r a n g e  of  P. Under t h e s e  circum- 
s t a n c e s ,  v e r y  temporary  or  l o c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - - t h e  s i z e  o f  
a n  a v a i l a b l e  o p e r a t i n g  l a b o r  f o r c e ,  t h e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
new p l a n t  w i t h  t h e  e x i s t x n g  i n d u s t r y  s t r u c t u r e ,  o r  v e r y  p o o r l y  
d e f i n e d  e v o l u t i o n a r y  p o t e n t i a l s  o f  p l a n t s  o f  t h e  s i z e  chosen- 
- w i l l  dominate  d e s i g n  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  o n e  i s  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e x t r a p o l a t i n g ,  and f o r  t h i s , k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  
p a r a m e t e r s  i s  needed.  
Engineering--Psychology and P r a c t i c e  
Under t w o  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  j u s t  l i s t e d ,  it  becomes v e r y  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s c a l e  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  e n g i n e e r i n g  
sys tems  such a s  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t s .  To t h e s e ,  w e  may add t h e  
t h i r d  c i r c u m s t a n c e ,  t h a t  o c c u r s  when t h e  i n d u s t r y  i s  new and 
t h e r e  a r e  s imply  n o t  enough d a t a .  
Twenty y e a r s  ago ,  w e  would have  had t o  admi t  d e f e a t .  How- 
e v e r ,  w e  have g o t t e n  used t o  Bayes ian  e s t i m a t i o n  i n  t h i s  
g e n e r a t i o n .  T h i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  amounts t o  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  d a t a  
p r o c e s s i n g  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  human b r a i n  t o  a r r i v e  a t  r e a s o n a b l e  
answers  t o  q u e s t i o n s ,  even when comple te  i n p u t  d a t a  a r e  l a c k i n g  
and t h e  r e a s o n i n g  program c a n  n o t  b e  s p e c i f i e d .  I n  one  way o r  
a n o t h e r ,  t h e  method r e d u c e s  t o  c o n s u l t i n g  t h e  e x p e r t s ;  i n  t h i s  
sense, experts are people with good knowledge of the system 
under consideration and similar or analogous systems. (Pre- 
ferably, also, experts are people who have records of good 
estimation in other, unresolvable problems; but this is a very 
hard qualification to check.) For questions of industrial 
scaling these experts come from the engineering community. 
It is therefore proposed here that one look at engineering 
practice for clues to the problem of "unknown scaling". But 
one has to understand this practice to interpret it. I claim 
the right of a physical scientist, more or less drafted into 
the ranks of engineers, to perform such an interpretation. 
Among other things, engineers, and particularly those 
engaged in project design, are goal-oriented. The basic ethic 
of engineering is to use the forces of nature to serve human 
goals. What the goals are is usually considered extrinsic 
though; they are set by the client. (Engineers are in con- 
sequence always mystified when these goals are not merely 
challenged, but blamed on them. And there's truth in this 
bafflement. Why doesn't someone blame the business and political 
leaders? And don't they get their goals from the humanists and 
social scientists?) 
An important goal is economics in the engineering sense: 
the product is to be provided at minimum cost to the producer. 
(The engineer does not question if a social cost is externalized. 
Somebody made the rule and it is accepted. Engieneering is a 
law-abiding profession, and also accepts rule changes which 
internalize social cost. It makes for a new design job. With- 
in the new rules, one also looks for minimum production cost. 
What frustrate engineers are rules that provide process, 
rather than performance specifications. Sometimes these 
actv.ally frustrate achievement of the desired performance goals, 
be they pollution abatement, "buy domestic", "create employment" 
or whatever. Sometimes they merely require expense for little 
result. But these are only surface manifestations of a greater 
discontent. The engineer's job is to find and design the 
process that achieves the performance goals, and when the 
process is mandated it means that some "amateur" has struck at 
the core of his professional pride.) 
Engineers are also conservative. There is a strong 
tendency for this to be interpreted in the political sense, 
where in fact it also applies; but this is ackually a coinci- 
dence. The basic conservatism, though is the tendency to be 
pessimistic about change. It interferes with the ability to 
expect results with confidence. Murphy's Law was invented by 
enqineers, from bitter experience. Thus, engineers are 
accustomed to taking small steps. They prefer new designs to 
evolve incrementally. The "back to the old drawing-board" 
joke (describing the engineer's comment as the airplane crashes 
during the test flight) is approximately 100% wrong in de- 
scribing engineering attitudes. (In the early 195O1s, Enrico 
Fermi was appalled by the slow progress of nuclear energy. He 
attributed this to the engineering conservatism which had 
already taken over. His aphorism was to the effect that "What 
we need are some reactors that don't work".! 
Since one of the goals of project design is economics, 
what we are dealing with is more than a tendency. The engi- 
neering team will simply not perform a job that doesn't fill 
the bill; or, if ordered to do so, they will make sure that the 
customer knows that they think it's stupid. If they are con- 
vinced that the job is uneconomic, there are many ways of 
making the cost look a little worse; and believe me, the tricks 
are constantly used. 
With this background, it is clear that, on the one side, 
engineers prefer the conservative and the incremental, whenever 
possible, and do not like "great leaps forward". This argues 
for a tendency to always keep plant sizes below the point of 
minimum cost. 
But there is another side... 
Engineers are quite naive in trusting rules of thumb, and 
the scaling law is one such rule that is generally credited. 
The law that is believed has the simple form of equation (1). 
Indeed, this is a major source of the belief that the tech- 
nologist always is looking for "bigger and better" with the 
assumption that bigger is better. So, countering .the generally 
conservative outlook isthe notion that economy comes in the 
large, economy size. The design group will always look 
longingly at the largest plant that can be built; they will 
insist the only obstacle to continued economies of scale is the 
inability to go further in size, in case existing manufacturing 
or construction methods have limits. 
It is my contention that conservatism and naivit& lead to 
a balancing of mystique, and that, gi 
actual rating of-units delivered at-a 
- 
estimate of PA in. 
ven 
g iv 
this balancing, - the 
,en time is a good 
ed that, when In a sense, it is suggest 
faced with producing equipment, the engineering community 
performs a valid Delphi analysis, and balances its prejudices 
for the big against its prejudices in favor of existina 
practices to achieve a result that is relatively free of bias. 
Indeed, my discussion of engineering psychology had the pur- 
pose (besides the obvious one of blowing off some steam) of 
indicatina why bias ought not to be pronounced in these scaling 
decisions. 
Scaling and Learning Parameters 
Up to now, I have asked you to absorb a great deal on pure 
faith. It may be summarized as hypotheses to be tested. This 
testing can not lead to validation of the hypotheses in the sense 
of proving their correctness; but to another type of validation- 
-that of utility. In the following section I will be studying 
the parameters of nuclear systems under two hypotheses: 
-- First, that the mean size of new systems, as measured 
by electrical capacity, is a good approximation to the 
optimal size, PMin. 
-- Second, that the optimal size, PMin, is subject to a 
continued learning process, such that PMin increases 
in a power law as the experience of an industry grows. 
From these data, one can infer some conclusions, that may 
or not be correct, about the future technical evolution of the 
nuclear industry. 
NUCLEAR SCALING 
The Approach 
We are now ready to apply the hypotheses of the previous 
sections to data. The basic data that we use are those that 
describe the electrical capacities of nuclear power plants as 
a function of their sequence of commissioning. In other words, 
we are using the "hardest" possible data--an unmistakable and 
unfakable statement of electrical power capacity--to derive 
the parameters of the scaling-learning law, equation ( 1 0 ) .  The 
data are those collected by NUCLEAR NEWS in their -most recent 
World List of Nuclear Power Plants [ 4 1  . 
Light Water Reactors 
Figure 5  exhibits the data for P vs. n, plotted in a 
way that requires a bit of explanation. The scales are P, 
electrical capacity, and n, sequence of commissioning. How- 
ever, individual reactors are not plotted. Instead, the P 
-
number (ordinate) represents average power of reactors 
commissioned in a given year and the n number (abscissa) is 
the geometric average of the sequence number of those reactors. 
The logarithmic plot is used because a power law is being 
investigated. Finally, the data are for all reactors, not just 
-
LWR's. However, so dominant are LWR's that we can take this 
as an LWR curve without significant error. The points marked 
by circles are reactors already commissioned and those marked 
by squares are those that are planned. 
The straight line is a regression of these individual 
points. The regression analysis is not too sound theoretically, 
as the different points represent different numbers of reactors 
commissioned in different years. However, the line looks good 
enough so that it is unlikely that weighting would change the 
results. 
The equation of the line is 
log P f 2 .01  + 0 . 3 8 5  log n , 
The result cf the fitting suggests the following: 
-- Reactors commissioned in 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969 
were probably below the size of minimum unit cost i.n 
that era. These were reactors ordered in the early 
1960's. By 1970, the optimal installed size of 
reactors was around 530 MWe, and roughly corresponded 
to the "Connecticut-Yankee, Oyster Creek" models 
ordered in the mid 1960's. 
-- The first reactor considered "commercial" should have 
had a capacity of about 100 MWe. 
-- As of now (1979), the optimal reactor size is about 
830 MWe. 
-- By 1990, the optimal size will be around 1100 MWe. 
General. knowledge of the nuclear industry indicates that 
the gradual increase of commissioned size stems from variations 
in the mixture of 600, 900 and 1200 MWe (approximateiy) designs- 
-the "standard" sizes--orded in the 1970's. The largest ones 
were those most commonly delayed, and therefore dominate the 
later commissioning dates. There is a suggestion (although it 
must be conceded that the reasoning is tautological) that the 
largest-size LWR's were ordered prematurely; that is, when 
these largest sizes were greater than PMin. 
Using a f3 of 0.5, equation (13b) suggests that b is of the 
order of 0.2. Learning is not rapid in the LWR business. Many 
in the industry blame this fact on the impact of ever-stricter 
regulations: that a lack of resilience to regulatory change 
is a principle reason for cost minima developing in the nuclear 
business. 
The data available to me do not permit an estimate of 6, 
but John Fischer's curves [ 3 ]  indicate that the minima are rather 
flat. This observation corresponds to large 6, and large 6 
means that 
-- It doesn't make too much difference what size is 
ordered, the unit costs are about the same. 
-- The plants are costlier than disciples of the simple 
scaling law expect. 
-- There is a tendency to go past th.e minimum for planners 
who have a "bigger is better" philosophy; they are not 
severly punished after all. 
These qualitative observations seem to me to fit the LWR 
industry quite well. 
Heavy Water Reactors 
Figure 6 presents all the heavy water reactors in the world, 
plotted one-by-one. The regression line is drawn in, but it is 
probably meaningless; for the points seem to fall into two 
groups .  The h i g h e r  g roup  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  Canada and t h e  lower 
group i s  most of  t h e  res t  o f  t h e  wor ld .  For t h e  r e c o r d ,  t h e  
r e g r e s s i o n  l i n e  i s  
Because t h e  d a t a  from world  H W R t s  d i d  n o t  g i v e  good grounds  
even f o r  t r y i n g  t o  f i t  a  power l a w ,  t h e  d a t a  were p l o t t e d  f o r  
Canadian p ressur ized-heavy-wate r -coo led  H W R t s  o n l y .  These a r e  
p l o t t e d  i n  F i g u r e  7 .  A s  w i t h  F i g u r e  5 ,  c r o s s e s  a r e  h i s t o r y  and 
c i r c l e s  a r e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  R e g r e s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  d a t a  g i v e s  
The r m s  s c a t t e r  o f  P a b o u t  t h e  formula  i s  n o t  bad - it i s  v e r y  
c l o s e  t o  220%. 
A s  w i t h  t h e  LWR d a t a ,  t h e  s c a l i n g - l e a r n i n g  law f o r  
Canadian  heavy-water  r e a c t o r s  l i k e w i s e  a p p e a r s  r e a s o n a b l e .  
Economies o f  scale a r e  i n i t i a l l y  l a r g e  f o r  such  r e a c t o r s ,  s i n c e  
a t  s m a l l  s i z e s  t h e  c o r e  i n v e n t o r y  of  e x p e n s i v e  heavy w a t e r  i s  
a  f o r b i d d i n g  i t e m  of c o s t ;  a s  power i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  i n v e n t o r y  
o f  heavy w a t e r  p e r  u n i t  power d r o p s  toward a n  asympto te .  I t  i s  
n o t t o o  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  s i z e  o f  commer- 
c i a l  u n i t s  s h o u l d  be  g r e a t e r  f o r  HWR t h a n  f o r  LWR. However, 
t h e  a c t u a l  power o f  t h e  " d e m o n s t r a t i o n "  u n i t ,  t h e  f i r s t  
commercial  r e a c t o r  t o  b e  b u i l t ,  was a p p r o x i m a t e l y  200 M W e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  300 M W e .  Again ,  a s  w i t h  e a r l y  LWRts, t h e r e  a r e  
i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  d u r i n g  e a r l y  c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  u n d e r s i z e d  
sys tems w e r e  used .  The p h i l o s o p h y  o f  " c u t  your  l o s s e s  w h i l e  
you are l e a r n i n g "  a p p e a r s  t o  be e v i d e n t ,  and i t  i s  l o g i c a l .  
W e  have a r g u e d  t h a t  H W R t s  s h o u l d  have  l a r g e r  Bts t h a n  LWRts; 
on  t h e  same b a s i s  as  w e  p o s t u l a t e d  a  b  o f  a b o u t  0 .2  f o r  LWRts 
w e  would conc lude  t h a t  b  i s  a b o u t  0 .15  f o r  H W R ' s .  The ra te  o f  
" ] .earningn seems t o  b e  q u i t e  s m a l l  ( s l o w ) .  Canadian  r e g u l a t o r y  
p r a c t i c e  h a s  been f a r  more c o n s i s t e n t  t h a n  U.S. p r a c t i c e ,  and 
t h i s  a r g u e s  a g a i n s t  r e g u l a t o r y  change as a pr ime r e a s o n  f o r  
s low l e a r n i n g .  I t  a l s o  casts  d o u b t  as t o  whe the r  t h i s  i s  t h e  
r e a s o n  f o r  s low l e a r n i n g  i n  LW'R's. I t  may b e  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
n u c l e a r  sys tems ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r  e n g i n e e r e d  s a f e t y  and 
emergency subsys tems  become more demanding as c a p a c i t y  i n c r e a s e s ,  
and t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e x i t y  o f  t h e s e  subsys tems becomes even g r e a t e r  
as a  r e s u l t .  
The Canadian  case a l s o  i l l u s t r a t e s  a  b a l a n c i n g  between 
economies o f  d u p l i c a t i o n - - p u r e  l ea rn ing- -and  economies o f  s c a l e .  
S t a t i o n s  come i n  sets  o f  f o u r  u n i t s ,  which a r e  t h e n  o f t e n  
augmented by a second set  o f  f o u r  u n i t s  t h a t  are o n l y  s l i g h t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  i n  d e s i g n  and r a t e d  a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same power. 
The midd le  u n i t s  of t h e s e  g roups  o f  e i g h t  come c l o s e s t  t o  t h e  
r e g r e s s i o n  l i n e .  I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  a c h a r g e  i n  u n i t  c a p a c i t y  
r e p r e s e n t s  a  one-t ime c o s t  f o r  r e d e s i g n ,  and t h a t  i t  becomes 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  more economic t o  d e f e r  t h i s  c o s t .  Only when t h e  
new-economy o f  s c a l e ,  from s c a l e - l e a r n i n g ,  c a n  pay f c r  r e d e s i g n ,  
does  it make s e n s e  t o  do t h a t  job.  The p r e d i c t i o n  on t h a t  b a s i s  
is t h a t ,  i n  Canada t h e  880 M W e  u n i t s  o f  t h e  D a r l i n g t o n  s t a t i o n ,  
which a r e  t h e  l a s t  f o u r  c ircles  i n  F i g u r e  7 ,  w i l l  b e  s t a n d a r d  
d e s i g n  f o r  q u i t e  a  l o n g  t i m e .  
Remarks on  F a s t  Breeder  R e a c t o r s  
There  have  n o t  been enough F a s t  Breeder  R e a c t o r s  (FBR) 
b u i l t  o r  c o n t r a c t e d  i n  t h e  wor ld  t o  make a  judgment on  t h e i r  
s c a l i n q  l aws ,  b u t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o i n t s  a r e  p e r t i n e n t  t o  what 
would b e  a  l o g i c a l  c o u r s e  f o r  t h e i r  development:  
-- They s h o u l d  have r a t h e r  l a r g e  B v a l u e s :  t h e i r  d e s i g n  
c o s t s  a r e  h i g h  and d e s i g n  p r a c t i c e s  a r e  e v o l v i n g ,  and 
t h i s  a lways  moves B towards  a  v a l u e  of  1 .0 .  
-- They a r e  n o t  now economic, and w i l l  n o t  b e  u n t i l  t w o  
t h i n g s  have  o c c u r r e d :  achievement  of  s t a n d a r d  d e s i g n s ;  
and development  and o p e r a t i o n  o f  f u l l - s i z e d  f u e l  c y c l e  
f a c i l i t i e s  t o  s e r v i c e  them. 
-- T h e i r  complex i ty  seems t o  i n c r e a s e  f a i r l y  r a p i d l y  w i t h  
u n i t  s i z e ,  a  p o i n t  which a r g u e s  i n  f a v o r  o f  a  f a i r l y  
s h a r p  minimum ( i . e . ,  a  f a ~ r l y  low v a l u e  of  6 ) .  
F a s t  b r e e d e r s  of  t h e  world - a r e  l i s t e d  i n  sequence  i n  
Tab le  1 .  
I t  can  b e  a rgued  t h a t  t h e  " s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  of u n i t  s i z e s  
around 300 M W e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e f f e c t  of many independen t  develop- 
ments  go ing  on d u r i n g  a  " c u t  t h e  l o s s e s "  p e r i o d .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  
a p p e a r s  t h a t  BN-600, which h a s  s u f f e r e d  many d e l a y s ,  i s  a t  t h e  
upper l i m i t  o f  what migh t  b e  expec ted  of a  second n a t i o n a l  
r e a c t o r .  Super  Phenix  i s  a n  e a r l y  p r o t o t y p e  of what i s  hoped 
t o  b e  a  s t a n d a r d  commercial  s i z e  l a t e r ,  b u t  w i l l  a l m o s t  c e r -  
t a i n l y  be  a  money l o s e r  compared t o  s m a l l e r  u n i t s  now. 
By ana logy  w i t h  t h e r m a l  r e a c t o r s ,  I would e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  
maximum l e a r n i n g  and b e s t  economy of  t h e  n e x t  g e n e r a t i o n  of 
F B R ' s  w i l l  o c c u r  f o r  d e s i g n s  i n  t h e  500-600 M W e  r a n g e ,  and t h e s e  
shou ld  b e  s t a n d a r d  f o r  some t i m e  t o  come. The mys t ique  of  s i z e  
i s  probab ly  p remature ,  even f o r  r e a c t o r s  d e s i g n e d  now. More 
l e a r n i n g  (and more i n v e s t i n g  i n  l e a r n i n g )  s t i l l  i s  needed. 
Summary of O b s e r v a t i o n s  
It. now a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  q u i t e  l a r g e  u n i t  s i z e s  adop ted  f o r  
L W R ' s  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 7 0 ' s  w e r e  premature .  However, t h e  p e n a l t i e s  
w e r e  n o t  g r e a t ,  because  i t  i s  a l m o s t  c e r t a i n  t h a t  t h e  c o s t -  
minimum power r a n g e  i s  q u i t e  broad.  I n  b r i e f ,  one  might  e x p e c t  
t h a t  f o r  any i n d i v i d u a l  s t a t i o n ,  t h e  l o c a l  and t empora l  f a c t o r s  
o f  convenience  i n  f i n a n c i ~ g ,  p r o c u r i n g  and o p e r a t i n g  L W R ' s  
shou ld  govern  t h e  c h o i c e  of  p l a n t  r a t i n g s  f a r  more t h a n  t h e  
3ctual capital cost economies. These remarks hold for units 
(probably) between 300 and 1500 MWe in rating. 
The development of Canadian HWR1s is more orderly and 
best illustrates the gradual evolution of standardized designs 
as learning proceeds. The Canadian experience also might be 
used to estimate the one-time costs of redesign for adoption 
of larger ratings as standard. HWR's seem to feature even 
slower "learning" than LWR1s, whose learning is already rather 
slow. There are hints that the region of minimum unit cost is 
less broad--i.e., the parameter 6 is smaller--for HWR's than 
for LWR's, so that it is more important for HWR's to be scaled 
properly. 
By analogy, FBR's would be expected to exhibit still 
sharper cost minima than HWR1s, and there will then be a large 
penalty associated with going overboard on "bigger is better" 
philosophies. FBR's, with one--perhaps two--exceptions, are 
still being built in "demonstration sizes", however. These are 
units that are deliberately smaller than the most economical 
rating, chosen because even the most economic size is not com- 
petitive during the period of market entry. Their ratings are 
around 300 TWe. Thus, we can probably guess that units around 
600 MWe will be the first "economic" size in the sense of being 
the first to provide electricity at costs competitive with 
other power generating systems. Again by analogy with LWR1s 
and Canadian HWR1s, the phenomenon of scale-learning is likely 
t~ be fafrly slow, and the medium-sized breeder will probably 
be with us for a long time. 
A POSTSCRIPT ON PLANT SIZE AND INDUSTRY SIZE 
I have argued that the phenomenon of scale-learning, the 
increase in plant rating that corresponds to minimum unit cost, 
as experience is gained, is a major factor in unit size growth. 
I have also argued that this factor is essentially autonomous; 
that it depends on plant characteristics and characteristics 
of the plant construction industry. 
It has, however, been often noted that plant size tends 
to increase roughly at the same rate as the industry with which 
the plant product is associated; i.e., that simple volume of 
business is an important factor on plant capacity. 
I find this to be intellectually disturbing. After all, 
if an industry doubles its volume of business, it is still 
possible that two plants on one site will be a better manu- 
facturer's response than making a single larger plant. Ob- 
viously, distribution limits on the product are a factor--a 
strong one in the electrical supply industry. However, at 
least as regards nuclear energy, scale-learning seems to be 
slower than industrial growth. This also seems to be the 
case with coal-fired power plants [3]. 
I would t h e r e f o r e  l i k e  t o  o f f e r ,  a s  a  d e v i l ' s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  
t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  o f  p l a n t  t o  i n d u s t r y  s i z e  i s  j u s t  o n e  more 
f a c t o r  i n  s c a l e - l e a r n i n g ,  and o n l y  r a r e l y  a  dominant  f a c t o r .  
One t h e n  h a s  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t o  c o i n c i d e n c e  t h e  many c o r r e l a t i o n s  
t h a t  have  been documented. I would s u g g e s t  a s  a n  o b j e c t  f o r  
f u t u r e  s t u d y  t h a t  t h i s  c o i n c i d e n c e  h a s  been  r e i n f o r c e d  by 
p r e j u d i c i a l  d e f i n i t i o n :  .when a r e  2,3,4 ... n  u n i t s  o n  a  s i n g l e  
s i t e  a  s i n g l e  p l a n t  o r  n  p l a n t s ?  
T a b l e  1 .  F a s t  B r e e d e r  R e a c t o r s  
Year 
1 9 6 3  
1 9 7 3  
U n d e r  
debate- 
deferred 
C o u n t r y  
U.S.A.  
U .S .S .R .  
F r a n c e  
U.K. 
U .S .S .R .  
F r a n c e  
F .R.G.  
Japan 
U.S.A.  
Name  
E n r i c o  F e r m i - 1  
BN-350 
P h e n i x  
D o u n r e a y  PFR 
BN-600 
Super P h e n i x  
SNR K a l k a r  
M o n j u  
CRBR 
R a t i n g  (MWe) 
5 7  
3 5 0  
2 3 3  
2 5 0  
6 0 0  
1 2 0 0  
3 0 0  
3 0 0  
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